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Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional 
Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military 
PAUL STOCKTON 
Critics of Congress often attack it for micromanaging the defense 
budget-that is, for dictating how much to spend on particular weapons and 
imposing other detailed requirements on the Department of Defense (DOD). 
Those critics urge Congress to shift its attention toward broader issues of U.S. 
military strategy, which for budgeting purposes concerns the size and overall 
characteristics that U.S. forces should have. However, as the old saying goes, 
beware of what you wish for; you might get it. Since 1990, key legislators have 
launched a barrage of proposals on defense strategy. This activism highlights 
the need to rethink how legislators link the details of the defense budget to broader 
policy concerns, and how the end of the cold war is affecting the mechanisms 
legislators use to shape defense spending. 
Members of Congress have long criticized their own tendency to micromanage 
at the expense of broader policy oversight. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
however, legislators have not only critiqued Bush and Clinton administration 
proposals to reorient the U.S. military, but have advanced such proposals of 
their own. Changes in the international system appear to have driven changes 
in congressional behavior: with the end of the cold war, legislators are no longer 
satisfied to focus on budgetary details and ignore more fundamental issues. Yet, 
previous studies have argued that the congressional preference for micromanage-
ment over strategy stemmed from powerful domestic factors, including the incen-
tives for legislators to pack the defense budget with pork for their constituents.' 
1 Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight," Political Science 
Quarterly 100 (Summer 1985): 227-248; Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: 
Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Jacques S. Gansler, 
Affording Defense (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Kenneth R. Mayer, "Policy Disputes As a 
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its Center for Civil-Military Relations. His current research examines how the end of the cold war 
has changed civil-military relations in the United States. 
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234 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
What has become of these underlying determinants of congressional behavior? 
How has the rise of congressional strategizing affected congressional microman-
agement? What are the implications for the evolution of Congress and the future 
of the defense budget? 
I argue that the end of the cold war has not only created new political incentives 
for legislators to rethink U.S. military strategy, but allowed legislators to use 
strategy as a political tool to win votes on budget legislation, both within their 
committees and in Congress as a whole. The rise of strategizing on the Hill does 
not mean that legislators are abandoning micromanagement. Dictating the details 
of the military budget still offers legislators the tightest, most direct control over 
defense activities. Rather, members are using strategy initiatives to promote their 
detailed spending proposals, thereby changing the nature of the budgeting process 
and the role of Congress in defense policy making. 
MICROMANAGEMENT, STRATEGY, AND DEFENSE BUDGETING 
In principle, decisions about military strategy should drive the details of the 
defense budget in a top-down fashion. After assessing U.S. security needs, de-
ciding how much to spend on defense and agreeing on the size, capabilities, and 
basic characteristics that the armed forces should have, funding levels for specific 
programs could be established to implement those decisions. Indeed, if strategy 
is to have any effect on restructuring U.S. forces for the post-cold war era, 
budgetary details must reflect decisions on strategy. 
The Department of Defense has established an elaborate process to incorpo-
rate such top-down, strategy-driven analysis in the president's budget request to 
Congress. 2 Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet threat, Secretary of 
Defense Richard Cheney claimed that the Bush administration had taken special 
Source of Administrative Controls: Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense," 
Public Administrative Review 53 (July-August 1993): 293-302. Kenneth R. Mayer, "Problem? What 
Problem? Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense," (paper presented to the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 30 August 1991); 
Herman A. Mellor, "Congressional Micromanagement: National Defense" in Gordon S. Jones and 
John A. Marini, eds., The Imperial Congress (New York: Pharos Books, 1988); Mackubin Thomas 
Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," Public Interest 100 (Summer 1990): 131-146; James 
W. Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform" in Asa A. Clark, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey 
S. McKitrick, and Reed, eds., The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1984). 
2 Harry E. Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy for the Post-Cold War World: A 
Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 
1992); Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision (Carlisle, PA: 
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992). Rothman argues that in 1990 and 1991, 
this formal process was circumvented by Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Colin Powell, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who wanted to revise the Bush administration's military strategy 
more rapidly than the process allowed. 
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care to rebuild the defense budget around a "zero-based look at our security 
needs."3 
The Clinton administration followed with its own Bottom-Up Review of U.S. 
defense policies and force structure. 4 Yet, legislators criticized both of these 
administration efforts to craft strategy-driven budgets. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) 
attacked the Bush administration for failing to propose deeper cuts and argued 
that the defense establishment is "a giant woolly mammoth [that is] eating us out 
of house and home. Now that the time has come for a massive diet program, 
the Administration has become so fond of the beast that it will only agree to 
give it a haircut and a shave. "5 Republican legislators such as Representative 
Floyd Spence (SC) attacked Clinton's Bottom-Up Review as dangerously flawed 
and warned that the administration's defense cuts could produce "disastrous" 
consequences.6 These attacks come as no surprise. Legislators have frequently 
used defense issues as weapons for political warfare, particularly in periods 
of divided government when partisan conflicts reinforce institutional rivalries. 
Moreover, if incrementalism did influence the Bush administration's budget re-
quest, that would be consistent with the way Aaron Wildavsky and others argue 
that large, complex budgets are usually made. 7 But a more fundamental constraint 
limits the effect of strategy on defense budgeting. Even if a president bases his 
budget request on a thorough rethinking of U.S. defense policy, Congress can 
alter that request and legislate program funding changes without regard for their 
strategic implications. 
Previous studies have argued that Congress alters the budget in just such a 
fashion. Robert Art contends that in authorizing and appropriating the defense 
budget, legislators "look mostly at the details of defense spending, but rarely at 
the big picture. "8 Legislators themselves have decried their tendency to "micro-
manage" specific program funding levels and to "lose sight of the major questions 
3 Dick Cheney, Testimony Before the House Budget Committee in Connection with the FY 1993 
Budget for the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 February 1992), 
1. The key elements of that policy reassessment are described in George Bush, "In Defense of Defense," 
reprinted in Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1991 (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1991), 131-134; and Colin L. Powell, The National 
Military Strategy, 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992). 
4 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 
1993). 
5 Robert C. Byrd, Testimony by Senator Robert C. Byrd Before the Senate Budget Committee. 
U.S. Senate, Senate Appropriations Committee, 5 February 1992, 6. 
6 Eric Schmitt, "Lawmakers of Both Parties Challenge 2-W ar Strategy," New York Times, 10 March 
1994. 
7 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1974), 13-15. Note that later Wildavsky argued that incrementalism is becoming less dominant 
in some elements of budgeting. Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
8 Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 227. 
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of policy, strategy and priorities. "9 Moreover, while Byrd and other legislators 
criticized Bush and the DOD for failing to offer an adequate strategy, M. T. Owens 
argues that Congress continues to block strategy-driven budgeting: "Ironically, 
although Congress criticizes the Pentagon for lacking a defense strategy, it is 
Congress that prevents it from having one. Anything approaching a strategy is 
simply precluded by congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. "10 
However, the meaning of micromanagement and its relationship to strategy 
needs clarification. Kenneth Mayer argues that micromanagement is such a value-
laden term that many analysts fail to define it and use it as ~ catch-all to describe 
whatever they consider unwarranted congressional intervention into the details 
of defense decision making. 11 The Department of Defense includes a particularly 
broad range of activities under the rubric of micromanagement, from demands 
for DOD reports to the imposition of far-reaching legal constraints on DOD 
contracting. 12 However, the form of micromanagement that generates the most 
controversy is line-item budgeting-that is, the congressional penchant for breaking 
the defense budget down into individual program funding levels, and to increase 
or decrease those line-item levels in conflict with the president's budget request. 13 
This article focuses on such line-item micromanagement and its relationship to 
military strategy. 
Micromanagement of this sort does not necessarily preclude the use of strategy 
to guide decisions on budgetary details. Critics of Congress often assume that 
micromanagement and attention to strategy are mutually exclusive activities, and 
argue that legislators should shift "from dwelling on small details to looking at 
the big picture."14 Nevertheless, Congress might use its proclivity for manipu-
lating line items to serve broader policy concerns. If legislators wanted to, they 
could alter specific program funding levels to implement the president's declared 
strategy better or to carry out strategy-related decisions made by legislators them-
selves. The impediment to top-down, strategy-driven budgeting is not micro-
management per se; rather, it is the lack of congressional interest in strategy. 
However, previous studies have argued that this lack of interest stems from 
political and organizational impediments deeply entrenched in Congress. The 
9 Sam Nunn, "Congressional Oversight of National Defense," Congressional Record, 1 October 
1985, S.12341-2. See also the quotations from legislators and congressional staff in Art, "Congress 
and the Defense Budget," 235, 237; and Gansler, "Affording Defense," 108-111. 
10 Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," 132. 
11 Mayer, "Problem? What Problem," 1-2, 10-11. 
12 Office of the Secretary of Defense, White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 1990). 
13 Wilson argues that Congress is moving away from this focus on line-item micromanagement 
toward a greater emphasis on issuing general rules to guide executive branch decision making. However, 
according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, legislators often craft such rules in a way that 
dictates funding for specific contractors or programs, resulting in de facto line-item micromanagement. 
James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), 242-3; Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 19. 
14 Gansler, "Affording Defense," 109; Mellor, "Congressional Micromanagement," 129. 
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electoral incentives confronting legislators create one such impediment. Gordon 
Adams, Owens and others argue that "the incentives for elected representatives ... 
have not favored debate over strategy, since their primary concern is reelection. 
When it comes to defense matters, the priorities of constituents are typically 
focused on the level and location of spending, not on its strategic rationale."15 
Barry Blechman and James Lindsay argue that legislators often pay greater atten-
tion to policy issues than most studies recognize. However, both argue that while 
individual members may care about policy, the fragmented structure of Congress 
makes it "virtually impossible" for Congress "to establish an overall military 
strategy and broad set of policies, and then derive a coherent set of programs 
to implement them. "16 These structural impediments are so formidable that they 
might only be overcome by far-reaching reforms in committee powers and legisla-
tive procedures-"too great a change to be realistic."17 
More important, budgeting on the Hill is an inherently political process, 
driven not just by abstract policy analysis but by the need for compromise and 
coalition-building between members with conflicting goals and interests. Les 
Aspin (D-W), who served as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 
before becoming Bill Clinton's first secretary of defense, argued in 1975 that 
many advocates of congressional budget reform want to "tum Congress into a 
kind of Brookings Institution or Systems Analysis office," where budget recom-
mendations can be based on rational assessments of military requirements and 
overall policy goals. However, w bile "they would like to see a Congress gathering 
and weighing information on that basis," they fail to take into account that Con-
gress is based on politics. Legislative conflicts in Congress are resolved more 
often than not by political pressure, not by any rational presentation of the is-
sues. "18 
15 Gordon Adams, The New Politics of the Defense Budget (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 19; Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense Budget," 142; and Art, 
"Congress and the Defense Budget," 240. 
16 On congressional interest in policy, see Barry Blechman, "The Congressional Role in U.S. Military 
Policy," Political Science Quarterly 106 (Spring 1991): 17-32; and James Lindsay, "Congressional 
Oversight of the Department of Defense Budget; Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," Armed 
Forces and Society 17 (Fall 1990): 7-33. On the structural impediments to congressional efforts to 
formulate military strategy, see Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 54-5; and Lindsay, "Congres-
sional Oversight," 10-13. 
17 Blechman, "Politics of National Security, 62. The most commonly recommended changes are 
the adoption of multiyear authorization and appropriations bills (which would be intended to shift 
congressional attention from year-to-year budgetary details) and the reallocation of committee responsi-
bilities, usually at the expense of the Armed Services Committee's influence over program spending 
levels. John H. Hamre, "Potential New Patterns of Congressional Review of the Defense Budget" in 
Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lind, eds. , Toward a More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense 
Reorganization Project (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishers, 1985), 170-174; Michael A. Freney, 
"Toward a Long Term Integrated National Security Strategy for the United States" in Robert L. Pfaltz-
graff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, eds., U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 352-3; Gansler, "Affording Defense," 111-6. 
18 Les Aspin, "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," Daedalus 104 
(Summer 1975): 163-4. 
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Yet, legislators are now offering precisely such rational assessments of U.S. 
military needs and offering their own proposals for creating a post-cold war 
defense strategy. In 1990, Senator Sam Nunn helped initiate this congressional 
strategizing by offering a series of speeches on the need to reorient U.S. military 
policy. 19 That activism reached new heights in early 1992, when A spin issued 
a set of proposals to restructure conventional and nuclear forces-proposals so 
analysis-laden that they would not seem out of place coming from the Brookings 
Institution. 20 Indeed, one member of Aspin's committee staff noted that he and 
his fellow staffers "joke about writing term papers" and refer to the committee 
as "Aspin U. ni1 But this effort was thoroughly serious in terms of the committee 
resources devoted to drafting the proposals, circulating them among legislators 
and outside defense experts for comment, and using the final recommendations 
to influence the House budgeting process. 
Other members have joined Aspin and Nunn in shifting their attention toward 
broader defense policy issues. Senator Byrd, Senate Budget Committee Chairman 
Jim Sasser (D-TN), House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta (D-CA), 
and other prominent legislators have held hearings on defense strategy issues 
and offered their own proposals to change the overall size and focus of the U.S. 
military budget. 22 Moreover, Democrats were not alone in proposing changes 
to Bush administration defense policies. Senators John Warner (R-VA), William 
Cohen (R-ME), and other Republicans offered their own initiatives to reshape 
U.S. forces and defense spending for the post-cold war era.23 Legislators from 
both parties have continued to launch such initiatives during the Clinton adminis-
tration. 
19 Sam Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," Congressional Record, 22 March 1990, S. 2965-2970; 
Nunn, "The Changed Threat Environment of the 1990's," Congressional Record, 29 March 1990, S.3444-
51; and Nunn, "A New Military Strategy," Congressional Record, 19 April 1990, S.4445-4449. 
20 Les Aspin, National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, U.S. 
House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992; Aspin, From Dete"ence to Denuking: A New 
Nuclear Policy for the 1990s, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 21 January 1992; Aspin, An 
Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options, 
U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992. 
21 Interviews with three House Armed Services Committee professional staff members, 10-11 June 
1992. 
22 Byrd, Testimony, United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
Budget Overview for Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., 18-19 February 1992 (Washington, 
DC: USGPO, 1992), 165-290; United States Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Hearings, 
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1993; Defense and Domestic Spending in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., 3 and 5 February 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1992); United States Congress, House, Committee on the Budget, Report by Leon E. Panetta, chairman, 
Restoring America's Future: Preparing the Nation for the 21st Century, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 
December 1991 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991), 11-15. On Cohen and McCain, see Helen Dewar, 
"GOP Senators Propose Doubling Bush's Defense Cuts," Washington Post, 6 April 1990. 
23 Helen Dewar, "GOP Senators Propose Doubling Bush's Defense Cuts," Washington Post, 6 April 
1990. 
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Despite claims that legislators would only focus on policy issues if the budget 
process were radically restructured, this rise of congressional strategizing oc-
curred without the benefit of far-reaching reforms. 24 Why do members bother 
with the big picture? Given the inherently political nature of the budgeting process, 
why are key legislators behaving as if they were in a think tank, playing the 
quixotic role of strategic pundits? 
One possible explanation is that with the end of the cold war, the Bush 
administration spurred this congressional activism by failing to offer a sufficiently 
rapid and far-reaching strategic reassessment of its own. After the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall, when Cheney testified on behalf of the administration's Fiscal 
Year (FY) 1991 defense budget request, he argued that it was "the worst possible 
time to contemplate changes in defense strategy. "25 And although DOD officials 
were secretly drafting plans for just such change, Cheney's public stance provoked 
furious criticism on Capitol Hill and helped encourage Nunn, Aspin, and other 
legislators in early 1990 to launch their own reassessment of U.S. policy.26 
However, the president moved to reduce this impetus for congressional ac-
tivism. In August 1990, President Bush unveiled his own proposal to revise U.S. 
military strategy and abandoned the business as usual stance that helped spur 
initial congressional interest in strategy. 27 Yet the attention to the subject by 
Byrd, Aspin, and other legislators persisted, even as the president proposed 
further defense policy changes and tied them to additional military spending cuts. 
This legislative activism has continued under the Clinton administration. Clinton's 
effort to restructure the U.S. military, built around his 1993 Bottom-Up Review, 
calls for spending cuts and force reductions beyond those proposed by Bush. 
However, those additional cuts have prompted congressional Republicans such 
as House National Security Committee chairman Floyd Spence (SC) to propose 
their own multiyear, hundred billion dollar plans to increase military spending 
and shift defense priorities. 28 Key members of Congress no longer strategize in 
the absence of presidential leadership; rather, they compete with the president 
to exercise leadership over strategy. However, the question is why legislators 
are engaging in this competition - and departing so sharply from the congressional 
behavior described by previous studies. 
24 Some of the more modest congressional reforms suggested by Art have been adopted. In particular, 
consistent with Art's recommendation that broad policy oversight be given an institutional home, the 
House Armed Services Committee created a Defense Policy Board in 1985. It was abolished in 1993 
by Chairman Ronald Dellums. No such board was created in the Senate Armed Services Committee 
prior to Nunn's initiatives on strategy. More important than institutional change, Art's argument on 
the need for greater political incentives for members to engage in policy turns out to have been exactly 
on the mark. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 242-8. 
25 Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," S.2967. 
26 Paul N. Stockton, "Congress and U.S. Military Policy Beyond the Cold War" in James Lindsay 
and Randall Ripley, eds., Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993). 
27 Bush, "In Defense of Defense"; and Powell, "The National Military Strategy." 
28 Bill Gertz, "2 Republicans Seek Big Boost in Defense Budget," Washington Tunes, 19 January 1995. 
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Another possible explanation for this change is that the end of the cold war 
has required legislators to shift their attention from the details of defense budgeting 
to the big picture. Samuel P. Huntington argues that during the late 1930s, when 
the country was split over isolationism and interventionism, Congress actively 
considered strategy-related issues and sometimes prevailed over the president. 
After the late 1940s, when a consensus emerged between Congress and the 
president on the need for containment-oriented defense policies, legislators shifted 
their attention from strategy toward narrower structural concerns such as officer 
pay. 29 The breakup of the Soviet Union has shattered whatever remained of this 
cold war consensus and rekindled congressional interest in broad defense policy. 
Arnold Kanter argues that the degree of consensus over cold war policy 
making is often exaggerated and that Congress has made more frequent policy-
driven changes in the budget than is usually recognized. However, he concludes 
that congressional activism on broad policy issues increases with shifts in the 
international security environment. 30 That assessment might also support the 
hypothesis that the end of the cold war has spurred congressional strategizing-
or, to put the argument more broadly, that change in the international system 
has driven a change in congressional behavior. 
However, as Aspin noted in 1975, defense budgeting is a political process 
where abstract reasoning about policy requirements does not always drive con-
gressional action. Previous studies have argued that the congressional bias against 
strategy resulted from the political constraints facing legislators, the process that 
congressional committees use to draft their own versions of the defense budget, 
and the competition for budgetary influence between committees. How did these 
factors help shape congressional behavior in the past? Have they simply melted 
away with the end of the cold war, leaving Congress with a less politicized 
budgeting process? Or has the collapse of the Soviet threat made strategy more 
politically useful within that process, changing the way members such as Nunn 
build winning coalitions on budget legislation? 
BUDGETING INCENTIVES FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS 
Critics of micromanagement often attribute it to pork-driven parochialism-that 
is, the desire by legislators to boost spending on defense programs that provide 
jobs for their constituents. According to Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), chairman 
of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, "Congress has made the defense 
bill a jobs bill. "31 Some members engage in this behavior because they hope to 
29 Samuel P. Huntington, 1he Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 131. 
30 Arnold Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970," American Political Science 
Review 66 (Fall 1972): 129-143. 
31 Quoted in Mackubin T. Owens, "Congress' Role in Defense Mismanagement," Armed Forces 
Journal International (April 1985): 94. 
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improve their prospects for reelection. Others with safe seats do so because they 
consider "helping the folks back home" part of their job. In either case, legislators 
turn to micromanagement as the most direct means to bolster specific job pro-
ducing programs. Blechman argues that these budgeting incentives make it diffi-
cult to build the budget around broader policy goals: "Congress is sacrificing 
overall consistency and coherence of national policy for narrow interests and 
short-term objectives. This is a natural consequence of the political calculus that 
inevitably dominates congressional decision making;" that is, the need to "protect 
the interests of constituents. "32 
But focusing on pork-driven parochialism misrepresents the nature of micro-
management and the incentives members have to intervene in the budget process. 
When legislators attempt to add funds to the defense budget, they sometimes do 
so for programs that have absolutely no job-producing benefits for their own 
constituents or those of their colleagues. For example, the members of the House 
Defense Appropriations Committee agreed in their FY 1993 appropriations bill 
to increase funding for DOD humanitarian assistance abroad.33 Policy concerns 
(and the possible political benefits of pursuing them) can prompt micromanage-
ment unrelated to pork. 
Moreover, when members intervene in the details of the defense budget, 
they often do so not to increase programs but to cut them. For example, the FY 
1993 Defense appropriations bill passed by the House on 2 July 1992 cut line 
items by a total of $9 .4 billion below the president's overall request. But this 
overall reduction understates the degree to which legislators slash administration-
supported programs. When Congress cuts total defense spending, members may 
still increase funding for line items the president did not request and make up 
for that added spending by cutting requested programs even more deeply. While 
the House Defense appropriations bill cut overall military spending by $9 .4 
billion, that net reduction included nearly $3 billion in additional funds for weapons 
that the administration never requested- and in many cases strongly opposed. 34 
Funding for those unrequested additions came largely at the expense of administra-
tion-backed programs. The FY 93 House defense authorization bill carried this 
pattern of micromanagement still further. The bill cut total defense spending 
by $11 billion below the administration request. However, within that overall 
reduction, legislators added over $9 billion in unrequested spending, requiring 
still further cuts in Bush-supported line items. 35 This suggests that legislators 
32 Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 21, 45; see also Owens, "Micromanaging the Defense 
Budget," 142. 
33 United States Congress, House, Appropriations Committee, Repon on the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Bill, 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992), 74. 
34 Pat Towell, "Big-Ticket Projects Remain Intact As House Passes Spending Bill," Congressional 
Quanerly Weekly Repon, 4 July 1992, 1975 
35 The FY 1993 Defense Authorization Bill adopted by the House included a total of $270 billion; 
Bush requested $281 billion. Data on committee authorizations of unrequested funds were drawn from 
the spending tables in United States Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Repon on H.R. 
5006, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess. (Wash-
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engage in two forms of micromanagement-program-cutting and program-adding-
and that members practice both when legislating the defense budget. 
What motivates program-cutting micromanagement? One impetus is fiscal: 
in order to make room for unrequested programs within a given defense spending 
total, members may agree to cut other line items simply to free up the necessary 
funding. The politics of pork can also contribute to fiscal changes; powerful 
legislators (or coalitions of members) may grab funds for their favored programs 
by slashing line items defended by weaker members. However, legislators also 
have other incentives to cut line items. Just as policy concerns can prompt legisla-
tors to increase defense programs, such concerns can encourage program-cutting. 
Even conservative Republicans such as Representative John Kasich (R-OH) joined 
the lead in opposing the B-2 bomber as militarily unnecessary. 36 Members can 
also seek political gains from cutting defense spending, although not necessarily 
from programs in their own districts. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
James Lindsay noted that legislators such as Senator Charles Grassey (R-IA) 
were already attempting to improve their reelection prospects through defense 
cost-cutting initiatives. 37 The growth of the deficit and collapse of the Soviet threat 
have strengthened these opportunities for program-cutting micromanagement. 
This does not mean that pork-driven parochialism has vanished. As the de-
fense pie shrinks, some members are fighting all the harder to preserve their 
constituent's slice, particularly when military spending constitutes a major source 
of employment in the local economy. For example, Senator Strom Thurmond 
(R-SC) repositioned himself in 1992 to battle more effectively for defense spending 
in his state by abdicating his position as the top-ranking Republican member of 
the Judiciary Committee and trading it for the equivalent position on the Armed 
Services Committeee. 38 
Legislators such as Senator McCain argued in early 1995 that the problem of 
pork in defense legislation may even be worsening. As Congress cuts nondefense 
discretionary spending, members are using the defense bill as a legislative vehicle 
to fund projects they previously included in other parts of the budget. McCain 
claims that "the insertion of these items has become an incredible art form," and 
that the refusal of Congress to cut such pork indicates that "business as usual" 
is continuing despite the new Republican majorities in the House and Senate. 39 
Enactment of a presidential line item veto may dampen the incentives for members 
ington, DC: USGPO, 1992); and Pat Towell, "Bipartisan Alliance Leaves Mark on Pentagon Spending 
Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 June 1992, 1610-3. 
36 On the rise of Republican and conservative Democrat opposition in Congress to the B-2 and 
other strategic weapons, see Paul N. Stockton, "The New Game on the Hill: The Politics of Arms 
Control and Strategic Force Modernization," International Security 16 (Fall 1991): 146-170. 
37 Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight." 
38 Kent Jenkins, Jr., "Warner Bumped From Armed Services Post," Washington Post, 30 April 1992. 
39 Walter Pincus and Dan Morgan, "Congress Protects Pork in Pentagon Spending," Washington 
Post, 28 March 1995. 
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to promote their pet projects. However, until the president can wield this authority 
in an effective manner, and avoid the temptation to approve congressional pork 
in exchange for items he desires, the persistence of congressional parochialism 
will reinforce pressures for micromanagement. 
What of the incentives to strategize? One of the key criticisms of microman-
agement is that it drives out congressional attention to broad policy and prevents 
legislators from following a more top-down, strategy-driven approach to defense 
budgeting. As Nunn stated in 1985, "Members of Congress and the staff are 
focusing on the grains of sand on the beach, while we should be looking over 
the broad ocean and beyond the horizon. "40 While members may cut specific 
programs because of their policy implications, such case-by-case micromanage-
ment will not necessarily lead members to implement broader prescriptions on 
strategy. At best, according to one congressional staffer, members and staff 
"back into policy. We debate policy when we attack or support specific weapons 
systems, but it should be the other way around. We should debate policy first 
and then determine which systems to procure. "41 
Analysts of the budget process argue that this behavior reflects the lack of 
political incentives for legislators to address broad policy concerns. In contrast 
to micromanagement, which can help members win jobs for constituents and 
exercise direct control over executive branch activities, "policy oversight does 
not enhance a legislator's credit-taking posture; it does not garner him electoral 
votes; nor can it be tied directly to control over executive action.42 However, 
new incentives are emerging for members to not only hold defense policy hearings 
and engage in other oversight activities, but to formulate and promote their own 
recommendations on defense strategy. While voters may have had little interest 
in such topics in the past, the demise of the Soviet threat allows legislators to 
link proposals on strategy to more immediate voter concerns. For example, Byrd 
has emphasized the "vital" need to cut and restructure the military to permit 
job-creating investment in the civilian economy. 43 Initiatives on strategy also 
garnered visibility for Les A spin and brought him to the attention of Bill Clinton, 
who named him secretary of defense. 
Furthermore, Blechman and Lindsay argue that regardless of the political 
payoff, many legislators pay attention to defense policy because they consider 
doing so as part of their job or find such issues personally interesting.44 The 
shattering of the basis for U.S. defense planning has strengthened these incentives 
to strategize. According to one House Armed Services committee staffer inter-
40 Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," S .12340 
41 Office of Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 30. 
42 Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 240. See also Lauren Holland, "The Role of Congress 
in Weapons Acquisition Decisions: Process and Policy Considerations," (paper delivered to the 1990 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August 1992), 11-12; and Adams, 
"The New Politics of the Defense Budget," 19. 
43 Byrd, "Testimony," 7. 
44 Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight," and Blechman, "The Congressional Role." 
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viewed while Aspin was still in Congress, Aspin "is a guy who is driven by his 
noodle. His noodle tells him that there has been a fundamental change in the 
world of defense and he wants to grapple with strategy. "45 A staff member of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee offers a similar explanation for Byrd's 
activism: "Byrd's interest in strategy is personality driven. He cared about military 
strategy as [Senate Democratic] majority leader; now that he's chairman of Appro-
priations, he still does, regardless of the expectation that appropriators care only 
about pork and budget details. "46 
This suggests that incentives for members to strategize now exist side by 
side with incentives for micromanagement. Despite the end of the cold war, the 
inducements remain for legislators to intervene in the details of the budget and 
either to bolster or cut line item requests. These changes can also increase the 
number of fiscal adjustments that must be made in other programs to stay within 
pre-set budget totals. While the incentives for micromanagement persist, the 
demise of the Soviet threat has given legislators stronger incentives to strategize. 
The political calculus of decision making no longer compels members to focus 
on line items to the exclusion of broad policy. Nor are the incentives for micro-
management and strategizing mutually exclusive. Within today's Congress, both 
sets of incentives are alive and well. 
However, individual members have a powerful impetus to offer proposals 
on strategy, but those proposals will not necessarily affect the defense budget 
or the line items within it. The legislation that determines the actual content of 
the defense budget is drafted by congressional committees. Regardless of the 
personal incentives that members have to call for top-down, strategy-driven bud-
geting, their calls will have little effect on the actual budget unless the committees 
that write spending legislation adopt such an approach. 
Moving beyond individual incentives to examine committee behavior is also 
essential for understanding micromanagement. Studies of congressional efforts 
to add or subtract funds for particular programs usually focus on floor amend-
ments-that is, on votes by the full House or Senate to amend committee legisla-
tion. However, the vast majority of line item changes to the president's request 
are initially made by the committees themselves when they draft their respective 
versions of the budget. 47 To what extent does the committee budgeting process 
enable members to aggregate their individual line item concerns into broader 
defense legislation? Do proposals on strategy affect committee legislation, or 
are they empty speeches that serve as a facade for unsavory but entrenched 
approaches to budgeting? 
45 Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 20 April 1992. 
46 Interview with Senate Appropriations Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992. 
47 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 19. 
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DEFENSE BUDGETING IN COMMITTEE 
The growth of congressional micromanagement has been especially notable in 
the annual defense authorization bills drafted by the House Armed Services Com-
mittee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Until the early 
1960s, these authorization bills addressed only broad funding categories, leaving 
specific pro~ram spending decisions to the House and Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittees on Defense. That reticence toward micromanagement has van-
ished. Over the past thirty years, the number of line items in defense authorization 
bills has exploded. Moreover, at least until recently, the HASC and SASC pursued 
this micromanagement while paying scant attention to broad policy issues. Nunn 
characterized the authorization process in 1985 as a version of "Trivial Pursuit," 
in which "our preoccupation with trivia is preventing us from carrying out our 
basic responsibilities for broad oversight. "48 
The rise of individual incentives to strategize has affected this committee 
behavior in some respects. As Nunn and other committee members have gained 
a stronger personal interest in defense policy, they have held dozens of committee 
hearings on strategy-related issues. Legislators have also directed committee 
staffers to produce numerous studies of such issues, and to formulate proposals 
on the appropriate size and composition of future U.S. forces. The collapse of 
the Berlin Wall prompted the Senate Armed Services Committee to reassess U.S. 
military requirements as soon as work began on the FY 1991 defense budget. 
The result of that work was a committee proposal for a new defense strategy to 
guide U.S. force restructuring, which was included in the committee report 
accompanying its FY 1991 defense authorization bill. 49 
In the House, the HASC staff worked with committee members to produce 
three studies of particular note. Dissatisfied with the administration's analysis of 
changes in the Soviet threat after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the HASC's 
Defense Policy panel released its own 308-page threat assessment on 9 July 1990, 
designed to give the committee an independent basis for deciding "where we can 
reduce our defense effort without harming our security." On 6 January 1992, 
the committee issued a study that critiqued the Bush administration's long-range 
defense plans for not being tied to specific threats and offered a more explicitly 
threat-based approach for evaluating future military requirements. 50 
This analytic effort culminated on 25 February 1992, with An Approach to 
Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative 
48 Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," S. 12341. 
49 United States Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, lOlst Congress, 2nd sess., Repon: 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), 8-29. 
50 Les Aspin, National Security in the 1990s: De.fining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, House 
Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992. 
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Options. 51 In that study, the HASC reviewed its analysis of the potential threats 
from North Korea and other nations, quantified their military capabilities in terms 
of "Iraqi equivalents," and offered four options for sizing and structuring U.S. 
forces to meet those threats and perform other possible missions, including that 
of providing humanitarian assistance abroad. The Force A option would give 
the United States a far smaller and less expensive force structure than proposed by 
the Bush administration. Option D would be more costly than the Bush proposal. 
Bracketed between was Option C, which Aspin claimed would cut the administra-
tion's total defense spending recommendations by $64 billion from FY 1993 to 
FY 1997. Aspin endorsed option C and cited the analysis behind it to help justify 
his proposal for overall defense spending levels for FY 1993. The HASC also 
produced an independent assessment of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf 
war and an analysis of future U.S. nuclear force requirements. 52 
While these committee activities serve individual.member interests in strateg-
izing, it is unclear how (and if at all) such activities affect the details of budget 
legislation. HASC and SASC authorization bill reports claimed that the hearings, 
analysis, and broad policy recommendations drafted by the committees shaped 
their budgeting decisions. The SASC report accompanying the FY 1991 authoriza-
tion bill stated that, "The specific budgetary adjustments that the committee recom-
mends for the fiscal year 1991 defense budget flow directly from the five essential 
elements of the new military strategy that it is proposing in this report. "53 In the 
SASC report for the FY 1992 bill, the committee claimed that the "new military 
strategy" it had developed in 1990 was still guiding the details of its budget 
legislation, and that those details were also shaped by the committee's own analysis 
of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 54 Publications issued by the House 
Armed Services Committee make similar claims, arguing that the HASC's FY 
1993 authorization bill was based on "a bottom-up" analysis of U.S. military 
needs. 
Nevertheless, interviews with committee staff members (all of whom spoke 
on the condition of anonymity) suggest that factors apart from analysis help 
determine the content of committee legislation. Regardless of how desirable it 
might be to rethink the entire defense budget, staff members on the HASC and 
SASC note that many line items are taken directly from the president's request. 
An aide to one SASC member stated, "We simply don't have the resources to 
really do the budget from the ground up, and anyway, who would want to? A 
51 Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four 
Illustrative Options, House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992. 
52 Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War 
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992); Les Aspin, Thinking Through the New Nuclear Threat, House 
Armed Services Committee, 22 June 1992. 
53 Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1991 Report, 21. 
54 United States Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., Report: 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991), 9. 
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lot of that stuff is completely noncontroversial."55 Moreover, many of the line 
item changes that the committees do make stem from fiscally driven requirements 
to fit programs within reduced defense spending totals, or to make room for 
increases in more popular line items. A HASC staffer stated that his committee 
also adopts much of the DOD request with limited fiscal adjustments: "In reality, 
the committee accepts the vast bulk of the defense bill as is from the Pentagon. 
We just pick out key issues to make changes."56 
This assessment is supported even by the portions of the FY 1993 authorization 
bill cited by the HASC as having undergone the most thorough policy driven 
revision. For example, the lead item on the committee's list of major initiatives 
in the bill was a recasting of DOD funding requests for developing tactical aircraft, 
reflecting the committee's own judgment of future security needs and the lessons 
of the Gulf War. Cheney's abrupt cancellation of the Navy's AX attack aircraft 
in 1991 made research and development funding for navy tactical aviation an 
especially controversial subject. However, the HASC accepted most of the presi-
dent's line item requests for that funding, changing six out of twenty-one line 
items for developing naval aircraft. In the overall budget for all navy tactical 
developments, which includes the line items for tactical aircraft, the committee 
changed only twenty-two line items out of a total of 167 (13 percent). 57 Three 
of the changes involved over $500 million; nevertheless, the HASC left most 
programs in that highly controversial budget untouched. 
Despite committee claims that their budgets are driven by strategy and policy 
analysis, political considerations still strongly affect the way they draft spending 
legislation. After the president submits his budget request (usually in January 
or early February), and the House and Senate Budget Committees begin drafting 
budget resolutions to set overall defense spending levels, the Armed Services 
Committees and Appropriations Subcommittees begin their own budgeting pro-
cess. Committee members and staff review the budget justification books accom-
panying the president's request and hold hearings on defense spending. The legis-
lative process then begins with the drafting of a chairman's mark-that is, the 
preliminary version of the authorization bill crafted by the chairman, his staff, 
and the other members and subcommittees he includes in the drafting effort. The 
chairman's control over the mark gives him his greatest opportunity to shape the 
substance of the budget. Hence, chairpersons have a prime opportunity to apply 
their personal interest in strategy early in the legislative process. 
But committees do not automatically approve the chairman's preliminary bill. 
Committee members have the opportunity to offer amendments to that bill during 
a mark up session and then vote on whether to approve the bill before sending 
55 Interview with staffer for a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 24 April 1992. 
56 Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992. 
57 The figures for naval aircraft development exclude code-named programs in the budget that may 
be aircraft-related. All figures taken from the "Navy tactical programs" table of the House Armed 
Services Committee, "FY 1993 Report," 120-123. 
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it to the floor of the House or Senate floor for final action. The chairman's need 
to build a winning coalition transforms his drafting of the mark into an intensely 
political process. No matter how sound the strategy Aspin included in his prelimi-
nary bill, that mark was doomed to oblivion unless he could get it adopted by 
his committee and the full House, preferably with as few unwelcome amendments 
as possible. That approval is far from inevitable, even when Democrats dominated 
the House Armed Services Committee. In 1989, the HASC rejected As pin's mark 
for FY 1990. While Nunn avoided such a defeat, his ability to do so highlighted 
his skills at coalition-building in a committee with a much thinner Democrat 
majority. 
One way a chair can gain support for his mark is to include the constituent-
oriented programs favored by committee members. By dangling the funding 
carrot in front of project-hungry legislators, and cobbling together their various 
requests into the mark, a chairman can seek bipartisan support for his legislation. 
Conversely, by threatening to oppose member projects, the chair can wield a 
powerful stick. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has a reputa-
tion for following this "project aggregation" model of defense budgeting. A staffer 
on the Senate Appropriations Committee argues that his counterparts in the House 
have "a casino-type mentality. Their bills are project-driven; members are con-
cerned with who gets what. "58 
However, even in the Armed Services Committees, chairs can run tremendous 
political risks if they trample on the constituent-oriented concerns of committee 
members. Aspin's FY 1990 mark adopted the administration's budget request 
and incorporated a number of defense program cuts, including ones in the V-22 
(which provides thousands of jobs in Texas and Pennsylvania) and the F-14D 
fighter (crucial to Grumman Corporation employment on Long Island). Aspin 
told his colleagues that he agreed with Cheney that given the decline in the 
overall defense budget, the committee should no longer demand funding for such 
unrequested programs: "There's no room for even the deserving add-ons, let 
alone the ones that go oink." He also stated that in ordinary times, pork-barrel 
politics would prevail and committee members would defeat efforts to eliminate 
such funding. "But this time it's different," due in part to growing pressures to 
shrink the defense budget and fears of appearing beholden to pork interests. 59 
Aspin's judgment was mistaken. George Hochbrucher (D-NY), armed with 
a small squadron of model airplanes, begged his colleagues to save the F-14 D 
and argued that the proposed budget "would put Grumman out of business. "60 
Committee members from Texas and Pennsylvania waged an equally vigorous 
campaign on behalf of the V-22. The committee approved funding for both 
programs and defeated the chairman's overall package. This is not to say that 
58 Interview with Senate Appropriations Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992. 
59 George C. Wilson, "Aspin, Contractors Trying to Save Defense Budget," Washington Post, 15 
June 1989. 
00 Molly Moore, "Cheney, Aspin Rebuffed on 2 Projects," Washington Post, 29 June 1989. 
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the V-22 and F14-D were without substantive merit; on the contrary, supporters 
of both aircraft argued that they were militarily essential. However, the defeat 
of Aspin's mark demonstrates how members who have disparate constituent inter-
ests can join together to build a winning political coalition. 
Aspin later took a different approach to crafting his mark. Reorganizing the 
committee staff in 1990, one of Aspin's initiadves was to create a "member 
services group" to handle special requests from his colleagues.61 His subsequent 
marks included funding for the F-14, V-22, and other programs that contributed 
to his defeat in 1989. A chair does not necessarily have to incorporate all such 
project requests; gaining support from a majority of committee members is suffi-
cient to report out the mark and send it to the full House or Senate for final action. 
One HASC staffer familiar with the process argued that given the importance of 
attracting support for the mark, "what's amazing is how little pork there is, not 
how much."62 Nevertheless, because chairs must adopt those projects they deem 
essential for victory, the committee budgeting process encourages program-adding 
micromanagement and transforms the pork incentives for individual members 
into legislative action. 
The extent to which pork drives this process should not be overstated. Because 
individual members can also demand program increases for policy reasons, even 
when no constituent jobs are at stake, a chair may need to incorporate such 
policy-driven concerns to build support for the mark. Staffers who help draft 
the mark even have a nickname for the occasionally peculiar programs requested 
by committee members- "pet rocks." Project aggregation can be built around 
policy interests as well as pork. Legislation giving the president a line item 
veto over appropriations could reduce the effectiveness of this coalition-building 
mechanism. If the president has the power to veto particular projects, he may 
be able to unravel the legislative packages cobbled together by committee chairs 
and complicate their efforts to build a majority for their marks. Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) argues that a presidential line item veto would ham-
string congressional action by enabling the president to cancel portions of a 
legislative package retroactively. According to Moynihan, "compromises and 
trade-offs are the key. If these exchanges cannot be sealed in legislation, all or 
nothing, then accommodation will be much more difficult if not indeed impossible 
to reach. "63 
However, because individual members also have incentives to cut defense 
programs, chairs have a second method of coalition-building at their disposal. 
Legislators who want to eliminate programs they consider wasteful or unnecessary 
may make their support for the mark contingent on funding reductions. Chairs 
61 Pat Towell, "Aspin Moves To Avoid Reruns Of His Political Missteps," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report, 14 April 1990, 1141-5. 
62 Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992. 
63 R.W. Apple, Jr., "Line Item Veto Would Begin Voyage into a Vast Unknown," New York Times, 
27 March 1995. 
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ignore these program-cutting sentiments at their peril. When the HASC rejected 
Aspin's mark in 1989, his refusal to slash the administration's B-2 bomber funding 
request prompted Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Pat Schroeder (D-CO) to play deci-
sive roles in that defeat. 64 As with funding increases, a chair may not need to 
accept all of these proposed cuts to create an adequate block of support. In 1992, 
Aspin defeated amendments to alter his budget by reducing its funding of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. Nevertheless, the political value of aggregating such 
reductions in the mark encourages program-cutting micromanagement. 
What role, if any, does defense strategy and broad policy analysis play in 
this political process? Prior to submitting his mark for FY 1992, Aspin argued 
that if the committee performed its own analysis of U.S. defense needs, that 
analysis might provide the basis for a less politicized approach to defense bud-
geting. Aspin wrote on 22 January 1992 that "By laying out clear linkages between 
the force structure and the threats they deal with, perhaps we can leave behind 
us the old Cold War politics over defense spending and build a new consensus 
based on a common sense assessment of our needs. "65 Analysis would replace 
politics as the basis for coalition-building; strategy would drive budgetary details. 
Aspin argues that his committee followed just such a "bottom-up, threat-based" 
approach in drafting the FY 1993 authorization bill.66 
Other HASC members disputed Aspin's claim. Although the committee's FY 
1993 report described how the details of the budget were based on policy analysis, 
some members who opposed the mark argued that politics drove key program 
funding decisions. The FY 1993 report offered an extensive policy rationale for 
National Guard funding increases that the administration deemed wasteful. 67 
However, according to Herbert Bateman (R-VA), John Kyl (R-AZ), and Jim 
McCrery (R-LA), that funding decision stemmed less from analysis than from 
the political popularity of the Guard, which provides paychecks for constituents 
and parochial voting incentives for committee members. Thus, "when it came 
time for the committee to make its choices, politics counted and sound national 
defense policy did not. "68 Critics of Nunn charge that he also exaggerates the 
extent to which analysis has supplanted politics in SASC budgeting. A former 
staffer for a Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee argues 
that in 1990 and 1991, when the SASC claimed to be formulating and imple-
menting its new defense strategy, "Nunn was putting a thin veneer of analysis 
over crass politics. He was driven by the need to put together a bill that would 
pass in committee and on the [Senate] floor. Aspin learned from Nunn." And 
64 Moore, "Cheney, Aspin." 
65 Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Cold War Era, 
House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992, 20. 
66 Les Aspin, Continuing the Strategic Drawdown: A Bottom-Up Threat-Driven Bill for the Post-
Soviet World at the House Budget Level, House Armed Services Committee, 1 June 1992, 2. 
67 House Armed Services Committee, "FY 93 Report," 255-62. 
68 Ibid.' 398-9. 
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well he has learned, according to the staffer for a senior Democrat on the HASC, 
who claimed that Aspin's ''big picture is a complete sales job. "69 
But this same staffer emphasized that the sales job has been extremely effec-
tive, and that Aspin used strategy as a political tool to win support for his mark. 
Aspin's own staffers on the committee argued that strategy offers two important 
political advantages in coalition-building. First, by drawing other members into 
the policy analysis effort and soliciting their input, Aspin was able to give them 
more of a stake in the mark that followed. Even members who opposed the mark 
praised Aspin's attention to strategy. Ron Dellums (D-CA) stated "that for the 
first time in my tenure on the Committee, there was an honest attempt to look 
at the long term goals and needs of our nation and its military, and to have the 
budget drafted on the basis of what the threat is, instead of auctioning up or 
down the numbers from the previous authorization. "7o 
Strategy also helped build support for the mark in a second way, by giving 
members a politically attractive rationale for backing Aspin's budget. One com-
mittee staffer who helped draft the mark argued that "the key was to give members 
something they could vote for and defend to their constituents. •m By linking the 
bill to a reassessment of U.S. security requirements, Aspin offered Democrats 
a way of justifying their vote against Republican accusations of parochialism, 
and provided them with what another staffer termed "a safe haven" on defense 
issues. Viewed from this perspective, strategy is not a substitute for politics (as 
Aspin claimed) but is an instrument of politics. Aspin used defense analysis as 
a new means of winning support for his mark. 
This suggests that committee chairs follow three different models of coalition-
building on the defense budget. In project aggregation, a chair bargains for votes 
by adopting the line item changes in his mark that members desire, either for 
parochial or program-specific policy reasons. In cut aggregation, the chair solicits 
support by incorporating line item reductions favored by committee members. 
In both models, the chair's need to build a winning coalition leads him to package 
member-specific concerns into the mark, and to transform individual incentives 
for micromanagement into committee legislation. The third model is that of 
strategizing. By offering studies on U.S. military requirements and other funda-
mental policy issues, and using that analysis to justify specific program funding 
decisions, the chair can cater to member interests in strategy and provide sup-
porters a politically defensible rationale for supporting his mark. Following this 
model gives committees at least the appearance of pursuing a top-down, strategy-
driven budget process. 
The extent to which strategy actually drives committee line item decision 
making is difficult to measure. On spending issues where pork incentives are 
weak or diffuse, and few opportunities exist for project aggregation, committee 
eJ Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 11 June 1992. 
70 House Armed Services Committee, "FY 1993 Report," 393. 
71 Interview with House Armed Services Committee professional staff member, 10 June 1992. 
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claims of having been guided by strategy are plausible. But most line item in-
creases involve both parochial and strategy-related issues. Army National Guard 
funding raises fundamental concerns over U.S. force structure and war fighting 
requirements; that funding also elicits support from constituents. Aspin's decision 
to support the Guard catered to a mix of member interests. Furthermore, because 
member interests are diverse, and because a mark includes thousands ofline items 
that mix pork and policy, chairs can pursue all three models of coalition-building 
simultaneously. Project aggregation, project cutting, and strategizing are not 
mutually exclusive, but represent an array of political tools for winning committee 
support. And as long as chairs consider all three tools useful for garnering votes, 
the politics of the committee budgeting process will continue to promote both 
micromanagement and strategy initiatives. 
However, while strategy now plays an important political role within congres-
sional committees, no single committee can impose its own strategizing on Con-
gress as a whole. Congressional power over the defense budget is extraordinarily 
fragmented, with autonomous committees (each drafting their own legislation) 
battling for the final say over military spending. How does this competition for 
power encourage micromanagement? Given the fragmentation of congressional 
budgeting authority, how could Congress as a whole adopt a single, unified 
defense strategy, and impose broader policy judgments on the details of spending 
legislation? 
MICROMANAGEMENT AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF BUDGETING POWER 
Robert Art argues that the competition between committees for influence creates a 
powerful spur to micromanagement. Until 1959, the Armed Services Committees 
conducted policy oversight hearings and only authorized the budget in broad, 
general funding accounts. However, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), the chairman 
of the SASC at the end of the 1950s, concluded that his committee was having 
less impact on defense policy than the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, 
which were already dictating funding levels for specific programs. Russell and 
his colleagues began to compete for more control by adopting annual budget 
authorizations that split funding accounts into more program-specific categories. 
According to Art, the committees did so "precisely because their members felt that 
general policy reviews were ineffective and put them at a competitive disadvantage 
with the Appropriations Defense Subcommittees, which actually controlled policy 
because they had the say over the details of defense spending. In short, annual 
authorizations were begun precisely because policy oversight failed.''72 Even 
SASC members who criticize their own committee for excessive micromanage-
ment recognize the competitive advantage that annual line item budgeting pro-
vides. Nunn told his colleagues in 1985, "Annual authorizations provide a strong 
lever to influence defense policy and provide broad oversight. Unfortunately, 
72 Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 241. 
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we have abused that lever; as the old saying goes, 'We have found the enemy 
and it is us. "'73 
Secretary of Defense Cheney argues that this impetus for micromanagement 
is strengthened by the tendency of the four key defense committees (Armed 
Services and Defense Appropriations in both Houses) to represent conflicting 
pork and policy perspectives. According to Cheney, "The desire of each member 
to be able to advance constituency or policy goals has the effect of pushing 
committees into competition with one another, driving the defense committees 
in particular into deeper and deeper levels of detail in an effort to secure a 
preferred outcome. "74 Strategizing offers chairs a political tool within committees. 
Between committees, however, micromanagement appears far more attractive 
than strategizing as a lever of influence. 
Moreover, even if members had stronger incentives to strategize beyond their 
own committees, many analysts argue that the fragmented structure of Congress 
would impede any efforts to agree on a single, coherent strategy. No single 
committee has the authority to dictate a defense strategy for Congress as a whole; 
nor does the Speaker of the House, the Senate majority leader, or any other 
congressional leader. Barry Blechman, James Lindsay, and Stanley Heginbotham 
argue that this lack of hierarchy prevents Congress from formulating broad de-
fense policies. 75 
The fragmentation of congressional power is especially disruptive for linkages 
between strategy and defense budgeting. 76 Under the 1974 Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act, Congress adopts an annual budget resolution that sets a ceiling for 
defense spending and other budget categories. However, Defense Appropriations 
and Armed Services committees remain free to alter line items within the ceiling 
(and to spend less than the ceiling permits, as the HASC did in its FY 1993 
authorization bill). 77 That committee latitude persisted under the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990 (the so-called budget summit). That act set caps on defense 
spending through FY 1993 and barred efforts to move money from defense 
accounts into domestic spending. 78 Nevertheless, within those constraints, the 
Defense Appropriations and Armed Services Committees have retained the power 
73 Nunn, "Congressional Oversight," 12340. 
74 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "White Paper," 20. 
75 Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight," 10-13; Blechman, "Politics of National Security," 55; Stanley 
Heginbotham, "Congress and Defense Policy Making: Toward Realistic Expectations in a System of 
Countervailing Parochialism" in Robert Pfalzgraff and Uri Ra'anan, eds., National Security Affairs: 
The Decision Making Process (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984), 251-61. 
76 Reed, "Congress," 239-241; Allen Schick, The Capacity to Budget (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1990), 170; Dennis S. Ippolito, Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from 
Roosevelt through Reagan (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 148. 
77 The FY 1993 Authorization bill reported out by the HASC authorized $3 billion less in total 
defense spending than called for by the final House-Senate budget resolution. Aspin, "Continuing the 
Strategic Drawdown," 2. 
78 Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery, "The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No 
Fault Budgeting," Public Budgeting and Finance 11 (Spring 1991): 26-40. 
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to adopt total spending levels below the designated caps and to alter program 
allocations within them. 
This committee latitude is particularly important because each of the commit-
tees drafts and adopts its own version of defense spending legislation. The House 
and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees produce independent versions 
of the annual defense appropriations bill, as do the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees with respect to the defense authorization bill. Each indi-
vidual committee is free to use its own proposal on strategy (or none at all) as . 
the basis for making line item funding changes. After the full House and Senate 
vote on the HASC and SASC bills, and members of both committees meet in a 
House-Senate conference to resolve the differences between their bills, HASC 
members can attempt to agree on strategy-driven changes with their SASC coun-
terparts. A similar House-Senate conference meets to hammer out the final version 
of the appropriations bill. However, no such conference takes place to resolve 
line item disagreements between the authorization and appropriations bills, much 
less to formulate and implement a unified defense strategy. James Reed argues 
that this "bifurcated" process "tends to fragment control over the military budget, 
thus compounding the difficulties inherent in congressional efforts to influence 
military policy. "79 
The intracommittee impediments to strategizing have declined with the end 
of the cold war, but what of these intercommittee obstacles? The competition 
for influence between the authorizers and appropriators remains intense and 
continues to encourage a fixation on budgetary detail. Despite an agreement by 
Nunn and Byrd that each committee would "try to avoid reversing the policy 
directions of the other" and that the appropriators would avoid funding programs 
that had not been authorized, the two Senate committees fell into open warfare 
over the FY 1992 defense appropriations bill.80 Nunn complained that the bill 
included $11 billion in defense line items that were either unauthorized or above 
the authorized levels. Moreover, in dictating line item changes that overturned 
SASC policy decisions, Nunn argued that the appropriators were making a power 
grab that reflected "a breakdown in the legislative process. "81 Appropriators charged 
in return that the authorizers were exceeding their authority by attempting to 
control the details of the defense budget. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), ranking 
Republican member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, told his col-
leagues that "the Armed Services Committee is not only micromanaging the 
[authorization] bill [and] the Department of Defense, but [also] trying to micro-
manage the appropriations process; every single nut and bolt that the Department 
of Defense must buy this year is line itemed now in the authorization bill. "82 
79 Reed, "Congress," 239. 
80 United States Congress, Congressional Record, 23 November 1991, S.17835 .. 
81 Ibid., S.17802. 
82 Ibid., S.17792. 
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The fragmentation of congressional power also continues to block agreement 
on a single, Congress-wide defense strategy. Now that the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees have begun including broad policy initiatives in 
their defense authorization bills, that legislation offers the best opportunity for 
Congress as a whole to vote on adopting a strategy. The full House has the 
opportunity to vote on the HASC bill (and the strategy it espouses) when that bill 
comes to the floor after committee markup. The Senate has a similar opportunity 
vis-a-vis the SASC bill. Thus, to the extent that the authorization bills include 
broader policy initiatives, the House and Senate could be said to adopt their own 
versions of U.S. defense strategy. 
But differences always exist between the HASC and SASC bills. And when 
committee members have met in House-Senate conferences to resolve their con-
flicts and draft a final bill, the resulting conference reports have authorized line 
item spending levels without offering an explicit resolution of disagreements over 
strategy or any compromise statement of what U.S. strategy ought to be. This 
lack of strategizing persisted even in the FY 1991 and FY 1992 conference reports, 
when SASC members claimed to have based their legislation on a fundamental 
rethinking of defense policy. Thus, when the conference report goes to the House 
and Senate floor for final action, members no longer have a legislative vehicle 
for voting on an explicit, Congress-wide strategy. Congress as a whole votes to 
micromanage the defense budget without enacting a common vision of strategy. 
While the fragmentation of congressional power impedes agreement on a 
single strategy, strategy is becoming a new weapon in the competition between 
committees for budgeting influence. Aspin and the House Armed Services Com-
mittee used their broad policy initiatives to affect decision making by other com-
mittees. On 24 February 1992, before the House Budget Committee voted to 
set the defense spending ceiling in its FY 1993 budget resolution, Aspin briefed 
Budget Committee members on his analysis of long-term defense options. Com-
mittee Chairman Leon Panetta (D-CA) endorsed that analysis, and the Committee 
adopted the spending figure Aspin recommended for his preferred overall force 
structure. Critics of Aspin subsequently charged that by focusing on analysis and 
withholding his spending recommendations until the Budget Committee voted, he 
had made his position much more difficult to challenge. 83 
Aspin's analytical efforts also encouraged the House leadership to tum to the 
HASC for guidance in crafting a House-wide Democratic approach to dealing 
with the post-cold war defense budget. Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA), Majority 
Leader Richard Gephart (D-MO), and Panetta endorsed Aspin's effort to devise 
a new strategy, and offer members beyond the HASC a rationale for their votes 
83 Pat Towell, "Move to Cut Pentagon Spending Falls Short of Critic's Goal," Congressional Quar-
terly, 29 February 1992, 478; House Armed Services Committee, The FY93 Defense Authorization 
Bill: Summary of Major Actions, 13 May 1992, 2; Letter from Les Aspin to Leon Panetta, 26 February 
1992 (provided by the House Armed Services Committee); James W. Canan, "Aspin's Agenda," Air 
Force Magazine, March 1992, 15. 
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on military spending. 84 Aspin even attempted to use strategy to reach across the 
Capitol building and influence Senate behavior on defense. One HASC staffer 
stated that "its no coincidence that we've sent early drafts [of the Aspin studies] 
over to the Senate side, and tried to target key Senators." 
This is not to say that strategizing has displaced micromanagement as the 
primary means to compete for budgeting influence. Setting line item funding 
levels remains the most direct, effective approach for committees to battle for 
control over military spending. Moreover, while Aspin's analysis helped him 
exercise considerable influence over the House Budget Committee's decision 
making, his success was less complete in affecting House Defense Appropriations 
Committee legislation. For example, despite Aspin's extensive rationale for reor-
dering the administration's tactical aircraft plans, the House appropriators adopted 
a plan that differs from both HASC and administration proposals. 85 And while 
Aspin prevailed on the House version of the Budget Resolution, the Senate Budget 
Committee endorsed the administration's spending recommendation, and the final 
House-Senate resolution ended up splitting the difference between the two versions. 
Nevertheless, Aspin has demonstrated that strategy offers a newly attractive 
weapon in the budgeting competition between committees. The fragmentation 
of congressional power will continue to impede agreement on any single, Con-
gress-wide defense strategy. However, this structural impediment does not pre-
vent committees from promoting their own broad policy initiatives. On the con-
trary, Aspin attempted to use strategy to overcome the fragmentation of congressional 
power and exert influence far beyond his own committee. 
Whether that influence will extend to the Pentagon remains to be seen. Ken-
neth Mayer and others argue that micromanagement offers Congress the most 
effective means for controlling DOD. By specifying individual program funding 
levels and imposing other detailed constraints on defense spending, Congress 
can use its power of the purse to seek direct control over the military. In contrast, 
broad congressional policy recommendations offer a less precise tool for guiding 
DOD. Such policy recommendations are also easier for DOD to evade, unless 
enforced by detailed changes in the budget. Thus, Mayer argues that Congress 
is "destined to fail in any attempt to exert more general direction on defense 
policy," and that many who urge Congress to focus on broader issues are actually 
hoping to weaken its power over the executive branch. 86 
However, Cheney and other Pentagon leaders went out of their way to casti-
gate Aspin's strategizing and urge legislators to oppose his broad policy recom-
mendations. Cheney testified that adopting Aspin's overall force structure (option 
C) could lead to "a hell of a lot of casualties" in future wars. 87 General Merrill 
84 Canan, "Aspin's Agenda," 15. 
85 
"U.S. Government Disunity Clouds Naval Aviation Plans," Defense News, 3 August 1992, 6. 
86 Mayer, "Problem? What Problem." 19-20. 
87 
"Stick with Pentagon Downsizing Plan or Risk Casualties in War: Cheney," Aerospace Daily, 
5 March 1992, 370. 
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McPeak:, Air Force chief of staff, attacked the proposal as "kind of senseless, 
and claimed that if it were adopted 'What you'll have to do is close down the 
Air Force. '"88 Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan testified that Option 
C would "break the institution" of the American military. 89 Navy leaders offered 
similarly dire predictions, and called on the House to reject Aspin's force structure 
and the analysis it relied on.90 
Why were these Pentagon leaders so vociferous in their criticism? After all, 
Aspin's studies imposed no legally binding requirements on DOD, and much of 
the strategizing included in the FY 1993 HASC bill (and accompanying report) 
offered only general policy recommendations. The answer is that strategy can 
affect congressional spending decisions, and those decisions have a direct impact 
on DOD activities. Cheney and the armed service leaders testified against Aspin's 
strategy because they worried that the House would adopt the Budget Resolution 
spending level tied to his recommendations. That fear turned out to be well 
founded when the Budget Committee adopted the spending total based on Option 
C. Congressional strategizing is important to legislative-executive relations, not 
because it might constrain DOD activities, but because it gives members stronger 
control over the budgeting process and allows them to enact a budget that reflects 
congressional rather than administration preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has moved beyond micromanagement into the realm of strategy. Al-
though legislators continue to manipulate the details of the defense budget, broader 
policy concerns now affect individual and committee behavior, with important 
implications for the nature of the budgeting process and assessments of Congress 
itself. 
Previous studies have argued that the congressional focus on micromanage-
ment rather than broad policy stemmed from constraints built into the heart of 
congressional budgeting. However, Art was prescienct in arguing that "if more 
policy oversight of defense is to occur, the political incentives to do it will have 
to be strengthened. "91 With the end of the cold war, political incentives have 
grown not only for legislators to examine fundamental defense issues, but to 
formulate and promote changes in U.S. military strategy. This shift in political 
incentives has occurred at three levels of Congress. Past studies argued that at 
the level of individual legislators, the need to get reelected created a powerful 
88 Huge Defense Cut Rolling in Congress Despite Bush, Pentagon Opposition," Journal of Com-
merce, 4 March 1992, B-5; Rick Maze, "DoD: Personnel Would Take Brunt of Cuts," Air Force 
Times, 23 March 1992, 3. 
89 
"Aspin Plan Would Cut Chance of Decisive Victory in War: Army Chief," Aerospace Daily, 4 
March 1992, 359. 
90 
"Another Top Navy Official Questions the Merit of Aspin's Base Force Concept," Inside the 
Navy, 30 March 1992, 1. 
91 Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 242. 
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inducement to micromanagement; by increasing line item spending that benefited 
constituents, legislators could boost their political fortunes. However, with the 
collapse of the Soviet threat, members can also seek political benefits and satisfy 
their personal interests in policy by cutting line items and dealing with strategy-
related budgeting issues. 
The political appeal of strategizing is still stronger at the committee level. 
In the FY 1993 budget process, Aspin used strategy as an important new means of 
building support for his mark. Other approaches to committee coalition-building 
remain important. In particular, as the HASC demonstrated in 1989, project 
aggregation and program-cutting can be vital to the chair's legislative success. 
However, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. They represent an array 
of tools for winning committee support where issues (and member interests) 
reflect a mixture of pork and policy concerns. Moreover, while the fragmentation 
of power between committees is usually thought to impede congressional strateg-
izing, Aspin demonstrated how strategy can be used to overcome that fragmenta-
tion and push for influence far beyond his own committee. 
This strategizing suggests some broader conclusions about the congressional 
budgeting process. In the realm of budgeting, strategy is usually thought of as 
a planning guide that ideally should drive the details of the defense budget in a 
top-down fashion. The inherently politicized nature of congressional budgeting 
has led many analysts to dismiss the possibility that strategy could play a signifi-
cant role in that process. Strategy is the province of think tanks and-perhaps-
the Pentagon. But strategy is more than a guide for planning. It is also a weapon 
for legislators to wield in battling for votes. The rise of congressional strategizing 
does not mean that the institution has been transformed into an apolitical Brookings 
Institution. Strategy is a tool of congressional politics, not a substitute for it. 
The rise of strategy in the congressional budgeting process will also affect 
the output of that process, but not necessarily in the ways that critics of microman-
agement have wished. Many of those critics have argued that micromanagement 
displaced Congress's earlier attention to broad policy concerns and have called for 
a return to that broader focus. Nunn, Aspin, and other legislators have attempted to 
reformulate the foundations of U.S. defense policy. However, despite this atten-
tion to broader issues, political incentives to make line item funding changes 
persist both for individual members and within the committee budgeting process. 
Dictating the details of the budget continues to offer legislators the most effective 
means of increasing or cutting defense programs. More important, micromanage-
ment does not conflict with increasing congressional attention to the big picture. 
On the contrary, to the extent that members do want to make fundamental changes 
in U.S. force structure, they will press all the harder to alter the details of 
the defense budget, and implement their broader policy goals through line item 
changes. 
This suggests that the congressional budgeting process may now be compatible 
with a more top-down, strategy-driven approach to defense spending than has 
been possible for decades. As long as Congress micromanaged the defense budget 
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while ignoring broader policy concerns, efforts to shape defense spending around 
strategy were futile. That constraint has vanished with the burst of legislative 
interest in strategy. Moreover, congressional interest in the big picture is likely 
to continue. The attractiveness of strategy as a political tool (and as a subject 
of member interest) varies with the degree of change in the international security 
environment, and with the extent of dissensus over the administration's proposed 
response. The end of the cold war provided a particularly vivid opportunity for 
congressional strategizing. While the transition to the new security era may not 
provide such inviting opportunities in the future, disagreements are certain to 
persist over the future purposes and structure of the armed forces. 
Nevertheless, three factors will continue to limit efforts at top-down bud-
geting. First, while strategy can play a stronger role in shaping defense spending, 
that strategy may not be the president's. Legislators are now crafting their own 
versions of the big picture instead of deferring to the executive branch. In periods 
of divided government, when partisan conflicts reinforce institutional struggles 
between Congress and the president, defense strategy is particularly likely to be 
a source of divisiveness rather than policy coherence. Yet, as in the attack of 
Senators McCain and Cohen on the Bush administration, legislators may some-
times struggle to shape defense policy and budgeting against a president of their 
own party. Second, even if legislators are able to dominate this struggle, the 
opportunities for Congress to agree on a single, coherent strategy will remain 
limited. Congressional budgeting authority is fragmented; and while members 
will use strategy in attempting to overcome that fragmentation, struggles to domi-
nate the budgeting process seem likely to persist. Finally, even the most concerted 
efforts at top-down budgeting will always be suffused with politics. But that 
does not detract from the significance of what Aspin and his colleagues have 
accomplished. Congressional strategizing is more than a facade for business as 
usual; it represents a new way of doing business.* 
* I would like to to thank Robert Art, Lynn Eden, James Lindsay, Kenneth Mayer, and my colleagues 
in the Department of National Security Affairs for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
